![]() (b) DuPont’s additional reasons for saying that ERISA barred Liv’s waiver are unavailing. ERISA’s QDRO provisions shed no light on the validity of a waiver by a non-QDRO. Being neither “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation,” the Treasury Department’s interpretation is controlling. The Treasury reads its own regulation to mean that the antialienation provision is not violated by a beneficiary’s waiver “where the beneficiary does not attempt to direct her interest in pension benefits to another person.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 18. The general principle that a designated spendthrift beneficiary can disclaim his trust interest magnifies the improbability that a statute written with an eye on the old law would effectively force a beneficiary to take an interest willy-nilly. Section 1056(d)(1) is much like a spendthrift trust provision barring assignment or alienation of a benefit, see Boggs, supra, at 852, and the cognate trust law is highly suggestive here. ![]() These doubts, and exceptions calling the Fifth Circuit’s reading into question, point the Court toward the law of trusts that “serves as ERISA’s backdrop.” Beck v. ![]() §§1055(a), (b)(1)(C), (c)(2), would be permissible under the Fifth Circuit’s reading. It would also be strange under the Treasury Regulation that defines “assignment” and “alienation.” Moreover, it is difficult to see how certain waivers not barred by the antialienation provision e.g., a surviving spouse’s ability to waive a survivor’s annuity or lump-sum payment, see Boggs v. It would be odd to speak of an estate as the transferee of its own decedent’s property or of the decedent in his lifetime as his own transferee. The Fifth Circuit’s broad reading-that Liv’s waiver indirectly transferred her interest to the next possible beneficiary, here the Estate-is questionable. (a) Given the legal meaning of “assigned” and “alienated,” it is fair to say that Liv did not assign or alienate anything to William or to the Estate. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Liv’s waiver was an assignment or alienation of her interest to the Estate barred by §1056(d)(1).ġ. Because Liv did not attempt to direct her interest in the SIP benefits to the Estate or any other potential beneficiary, her waiver did not constitute an assignment or alienation rendered void under §1056(d)(1). As relevant here, the District Court entered summary judgment for the Estate, ordering DuPont to pay the benefits to the Estate. The Estate filed suit, alleging that Liv had waived her SIP benefits in the divorce and thus respondents, the employer and the SIP plan administrator (together, DuPont), had violated ERISA by paying her. On William’s death, petitioner Kari Kennedy, his daughter and the executrix of his Estate, asked for the SIP funds to be distributed to the Estate, but the plan administrator relied on William’s designation form and paid them to Liv. Their subsequent divorce decree divested Liv of her interest in the SIP benefits, but William did not execute a document removing Liv as the SIP beneficiary. Upon their marriage, William designated Liv Kennedy his SIP beneficiary and named no contingent beneficiary. Under the terms of the plan, if there is no surviving spouse or designated beneficiary at the time of death, distribution is made as directed by the estate’s executor or administrator. The decedent, William Kennedy, participated in his employer’s savings and investment plan (SIP), with power both to designate a beneficiary to receive the funds upon his death and to replace or revoke that designation as prescribed by the plan administrator. §1104(a)(1)(D) requires covered pension benefit plans to “provide that benefits … may not be assigned or alienated,” §1056(d)(1) and exempts from this bar qualified domestic relations orders (QDROs), §1056(d)(3). The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), as relevant here, obligates administrators to manage ERISA plans “in accordance with the documents and instruments governing” them, 29 U. PLAN ADMINISTRATOR FOR DuPONT SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT PLAN et al.Ĭertiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit KENNEDY, executrix of the ESTATE OF KENNEDY, DECEASED v. PLAN ADMINISTRATOR FOR DUPONT SAV.AND INVESTMENT PLAN
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